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By passing the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress created
potential safety hazards by proposing the introduction of aircraft into an already
congested national airspace (NAS) (FAA, 2014). The FAA has established
saturation of the NAS in congested areas and recognizes the limitation of growth
unless major changes are made to the NAS (FAA, 2011). The introduction of
UAS into the public aviation system is a new venture that may have negative
effects on the operational safety of the NAS, as well as a negative public
perception. Unknowns pertaining to effects on safety include midair collision
avoidance, terrain avoidance and lost link incidents. The US Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has identified many of the safety concerns defined
in the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. However, some key issues
remained incomplete (US GAO, 2014).
Several studies based on UAS features and the ability for the aircraft to
meet safety standards were recently conducted. One such study, by CuernoRejado, C., & Martínez-Val, R. (2011), addressed UAS civil airworthiness and
the regulatory efforts from manufacturers’ standpoint and how they compare to
the operational procedures. Another conducted by Casarosa, C., Galatolo, R.,
Mengali, G., & Quarta, A. (2004), before the new legislation passed, suggested
that, “The lack of airworthiness and certification criteria for the employment of
UAS vehicles in the civilian field has caused an uncontrolled proliferation of
projects and the construction of a number of UAS prototypes which differ in
dimension, weight, flight characteristics and payload carriage (Casarosa, 2004).”
Even though these studies address safety, there has not been research conducted
on the safety concerns with comparison to the accident record.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the most common unmanned
aerial system (UAS) accidents from 2009-2014 and determine if a relationship
between actual UAS accidents and safety concerns regarding their integration into
the National Airspace System (NAS) existed. The research survey and interview
questions created by the researchers explored the most common safety concerns
and why they were a specific concern of US Air Force (USAF) UAS pilots and
sensor operators.
Research Objective and Questions
The research methodology was designed with the intent of producing
qualitative and quantitative results to answer the following research objective and
related research questions. Research Objective: Based on the most common UAS
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accidents causes and US Air Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor
operators opinions, is there a relationship between safety concerns and safety
issues?
Research Questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What safety features could prevent midair collisions?
What safety features may prevent accidents during lost link events?
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents?
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without accidents?
What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five years?
Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more
accidents than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements?
7. How do current and proposed safety features integrated into a UAS
prevent the most common accident occurrences?
8. Does UAS pilot training reduce the number of UAS accidents?
Research Approach
The quantitative approach was conducted to find the most common causes
of UAS incidents, accidents and mishaps between June 2009 and June 2014
through the use of online databases. To receive expert opinions on safety, the
qualitative research method consisted of a research survey (Appendix A) and
interview questions (Appendix B) created for US Air Force UAS instructors and
evaluator pilots and sensor operators. The information gathered from the
qualitative approach was compared to the quantitative findings to determine
whether a relationship between the safety concerns and safety records existed.
Methodology
Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis
This study referenced US Air Force (USAF), Navy (USN) and Army
(USA) accident databases to complete the quantitative data collection on UAS
accidents in the last five years and to determine the most common causes for
accidents. The information was solicited via Freedom of Information Act formal
requests to the Navy and Army Safety Institutions. The Air Force data was
compiled from the USAF Judge Advocate General public webpage. The
information collected from all services was not always complete due to the nature
of the operations in which the UAS was used. The USN and USA did not provide
specific dates or years, but did conform to the five-year period in the study, while
the USAF did provide that information. The data was compiled using a manual

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1150

2

Hamilton et al.: Integration of Military UAS into the US National Airspace System

tracking method to conclude if there were specific factors for the preponderance
of accidents, and to show any significant difference in the accidents based on
operator factors or equipment factors.
The data collected for the quantitative study was analyzed manually.
Since the data was tracked manually, each accident was placed into accident class
categories that included: USAF- Class A & Unknown; USN- Class A, B, C, H
and USA- Class A, B, C, D, E. Within the class categories, the accidents were
categorized by causal category: pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of
controls (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O). Additionally, causal categories were
categorized by period of flight: takeoff (TO), cruise (CR), landing (L) and other
(O). From the selected categories, the totals were added to find the most common
causal for the accident and most common period of flight. Lastly, categories of
impacts with structures, near midair and midair collisions were recorded by the
researchers.
Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis
Seven US Air Force instructor and evaluator UAS pilots and sensor
operators were recruited to support the qualitative data collection. Due to Air
Force regulations, the pilots and sensor operators could not provide support
during duty hours or from government computers so the researchers used private
emails and phone numbers to forward the research survey and conduct the
interview. The seven pilots and sensor operators who completed the survey were
also asked to participate in the interview element of this study. Three participants
participated in the interview process. To provide a scalable measure of concerns,
a Likert-type scale was used for the survey. The interviews were conducted to
provide supporting data that could not be measured by the research survey.
The qualitative data was collected in two manners: (1) Likert-type scale
and (2) personal interviews of each pilot and sensor operator. The qualitative
Likert-type scale and participant answers were created and compiled by use of an
online survey service, Survey Monkey. The online survey database provided the
capability to analyze data trends of answers. The database was able to provide
support to find the mean, mode and median for each completed survey. The
interviews were recorded and transcribed for coding using SPSS Statistics, a
software package used for statistical analysis. Approval was granted from the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Oklahoma State University prior to
conducting the study.
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Instrument Validity and Reliability
The validation of a survey instrument allows the researchers to draw
meaningful and justifiable inferences from participant data (Creswell, 2004).
Regarding the reliability of the instrument, Creswell (2004) states that individual
scores from an instrument should be reasonably constant or stable across repeated
presentations of the instrument. The two research instruments used in this study
(i.e. safety concern questionnaire and the interview questions) were validated by
testing with a small group of military pilots and sensor operators associated with
unmanned aerial systems. Furthermore, a small group of aviation academicians
reviewed and provided revisions to both instruments. For both instruments, this
resulted in the elimination and replacement of several questions, as well as the
rewording of other questions for clarity.
Findings
Between 2009 and 2014, there were 417 reported accidents by the US Air
Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Army (USA) involving UAS. Of those
accidents, the USAF reported 45, USA reported 324 and the USN reported 48.
Due to the sensitive nature of the UAS usage, not all services provided a
breakdown of accidents by year, but provided the number of accidents and causes
between the time-period requested 2009-2014. The USAF did break down
accidents by years; these included 11 accidents in 2009, 7 accidents in 2010, 14
accidents in 2011, 10 accidents in 2012, and 3 accidents in 2013; 2014 numbers
were not available at the time of this study. Each military service accident
database was categorized into classes relevant to the specific service definition of
accident class; Table 1 differentiates the numbers of accidents by class and
service that were included in this study.
Accident Classes
A total of 417 total UAS accidents reported in five distinct classes from
2009-2014 between these three US military services. Of the 417 UAS accidents
included in the study, the data show a disparity between accident numbers and
classes between the three services. For example, the USAF and USA both had 38
and 35 Class A accidents during this time period, while the USN reported 8, but
had 20 Class H accidents; the USAF and USA did not provide Class H
information. To help explain this disparity, the definitions of each class are
defined below to show similarities and differences of accident types. These
accident classes are defined by Air Force AFI91-204 (2014), Army Regulation
385-10 (2013), Operational Navy Instruction (OPNAV) 3750.6S (2014),
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Department of Defense (DOD) (2011) and Naval Aviation Safety Management
System (OPNAVINST) 3750.6S (2014).
Table 1
Accident Class Totals

Class Totals
A
B
C
D
E
H
Unknown

Air Force
45
38
0
0
0
N/A
N/A
7

Navy
48
8
5
15
N/A
N/A
20
0

Army
324
35
72
159
57
1
N/A
0

Class A Accidents:
 Resulted in death
 Resulted in permanent total disability
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $2 million dollars
 Resulted in a destroyed aircraft (excluding UAS groups 1, 2, or 3)
Class B Accidents:
 Resulted in permanent partial disability
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $500,000 dollars
 Resulted in hospitalization for inpatient care of three or more individuals (not
including observation or diagnostic care)
Class C Accidents:
 Resulted in a nonfatal injury or occupational illness that caused loss of 1 or
more days from work not including the day or shift it occurred (lost-workday
case)
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $50,000 dollars
Class D Accidents:
 Resulted in a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as class A,
B, or C
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $20,000 dollars
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Class E Accidents:
 An Army accident resulting in total cost of property damage equal to or
greater than $5,000 but less than $20,000
Class H Accidents:
 Hazard is delineated as an “H” in the severity code; hazards include near midair collisions
 A hazard is any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or
death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or
damage to the environment
 The hazard/near miss did not exceed the Class D mishap minimum property
damage threshold of $20,000 and/or the Class D minimum injury threshold of
first aid, loss of consciousness, light duty, limited duty
The disparity between classes was noted due to the dollar amount for the
UAS used by each service. The USAF reported UAS accidents involving the
MQ1B, MQ9, EQ4 and QRF-4C aircraft. For example, each UAS is valued over
the $2,000,000 amount listed in the Class A definition (AFI91-204), thus 38
accidents involving UAS for the USAF during the time period researched were
Class A and the seven not listed as Class A were unknown due to the lack of
information on cost for repair of the UAS.
The USN reported accidents involving BQM74, K-MAX, MQ-001L, MQ008B, MQ-9, RQ-1, RQ-2B, RQ-4A, RQ-7B, RQ-21B, RQ-23 and SCAN
EAGLE. The UAS operated by the USN and involved in this study. The USA
reported accidents involving MAV, MQ-1B, MQ-1C, MQ-5B, RQ-11, RQ-11B,
RQ-7, RQ-20A and RQ-12A (WASP3). Figure 1 provides the reported UAS
accidents by class from 2009-2014 timeframe.
Within each class each accident was further categorized by accident cause
and period of flight. The accident cause categories included: pilot error (PE),
engine (E), loss of control (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O). The period of flight
categories included: takeoff (T/O), cruise (CR), landing (L) and other (O).
Quantitative Findings
Safety concerns and safety issues relationship. From 2009 to 2014, the
three military branches observed in this research study reported accidents caused
by pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of control (CT), lost link (LL) and
other (O). Figure 2 provides the most common accident causes by service, while
Figure 3 provides the total number of accidents by cause over a five-year period.
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Figure 1. Accident by Class

Figure 2. Most Common Accident Causes by Service
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Figure 3. Most Common Accident Causes Totals
Safety concern. Seven UAS pilots and sensor operators from the USAF
completed the research survey. The survey consisted of 30 Likert-scale
statements relating to flight experience, flight safety concerns during phases of
flight and safety concerns with regards to UAS sharing the airspace with
commercial airliners.
After collecting the data from the accident databases, this data and the
responses to the Likert-type scale were compared using observations of the data.
An analysis of the data, employing data comparison methodologies, was
conducted to determine whether any relationships between safety concerns and
safety accidents existed. Comparison between the most common accidents during
the three phases of flight and the level of safety concerns that each research
subject had for accidents to occur during those phases of flight was completed.
UAS flight profiles were categorized into takeoff, cruise and landing and the most
common accidents divided into the respective phase of flight.
Research questions
What safety features could prevent midair collisions? While
conducting this study, the researchers identified 15 near mid-air collisions and
two mid-air collisions from 2009-2014 reported by the USN and the USA. The
USN reported 15 near mid-air and zero mid-air collisions; and there were no
fatalities or injuries in any of the cases reported, while the USA reported two mid-

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1150

8

Hamilton et al.: Integration of Military UAS into the US National Airspace System

air collisions. Near mid-air collisions are defined by the FAA (2016) as, “an
incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of a
collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or
a report is received from a pilot or flight crew member stating that a collision
hazard existed between two or more aircraft.” The English Dictionary (2016)
defines mid-air collision as, “an aviation accident in which two or more aircraft
come into contact during flight.” The USAF did not report any near mid-air or
mid-air collisions. The USN near mid-air collisions consisted of nine near-mid
air with other UAS, three near mid-air with fixed wing P-3 aircraft, one near-mid
air with rotary wing AH-1W helicopter and two near mid-air with unknown
aircrafts. The USA mid-air collisions consisted of one mid-air collision between
an RQ7B and fixed wing C-130 aircraft. Both aircraft sustained damage but the
accident did not result in fatalities. The second mid-air collision occurred
between a PUMA and an unknown (not reported) type aircraft; no fatalities were
noted for this accident.
To avoid mid-air collisions, many aircraft types (including commercial
airlines, military, government, and some GA aircraft) use a Terrain Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS). The TCAS uses transponder information from
surrounding aircraft to provide the pilots information on developing safety
situations. It additionally uses Terrain Advisory Line (TAL) to provide pilots
timely information to avoid pending collisions with terrain. However; currently,
UAS do not have TCAS or the capability to see and avoid other aircraft. See and
avoid is defined in CFR 14 91.113 (b) as:
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and
avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the
right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass
over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. (FAA, 2015, p. 1)
According to the FAA (2013) document, Integration of Civil Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap, “sense
and avoid (SAA) capability must provide for self-separation and ultimately for
collision avoidance protection between UAS and other aircraft analogous to the
‘see and avoid’ operations of manned aircraft that meets an acceptable level of
safety,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 19). Additionally, the FAA continues to state that, “unmanned flight will require new or revised operational rules to regulate the use
of SAA systems as an alternate method to comply with see and avoid operational
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rules,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 19). With this in mind, currently not all UAS systems
have a SAA or see and avoid capability.
Technologically advanced UAS, such as the MQ-4 and other militarily
used UAS, utilize cameras for the operators, but these cameras have a limited
field of view. To support the SAA and see and avoid concept, UAS aircraft and
UAS pilots would have to acquire and develop a “see and avoid, radar, visual
sighting, separation standards, proven technologies and procedures and welldefined pilot behaviors,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 19) to ensure safety of flight. To
support the SAA and see and avoid policies, new technology with new piloting
processes and procedures need to be developed. Currently, Ground Based Sense
and Avoid (GBSAA) and Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) concepts and
procedures are being studied and evaluated by public agencies and commercial
companies (FAAa, 2013). These new concepts and procedures should help
support future development of safety procedures for UAS.
What safety features may prevent accidents during lost link events?
Not all UAS have safety features for a lost link scenario; however, all UAS
identified in this research study have a built in safety feature for lost link
incidents. Lost link as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is,
“an interruption or loss of the control link” (FAA, 2013b, p. 27). The safety
feature is programmed to direct the UAS to waypoints in route to its home station
if it loses link to its host.
During this study, it was determined there were 71 total lost link
occurrences reported from the USAF, USN, and USA. According to the FAA
Roadmap (2013), “air traffic products, policies and procedures need to be
reviewed and refined or developed through supporting research to permit UAS
operations in the NAS,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 17). These products, policies and
procedures include operations and contingency procedures for UAS experiencing
lost link events. The FAA has incorporated human factors into their contingency
plan for dealing with lost link events, categorizing lost link events under
“Predictability and contingency management,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 30) research
challenge. Figure 4 provides the number of lost link incidents by service and
class.
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Figure 4. Lost Link
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents?
As mentioned, there were 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and
USN, All 71 of the reported lost link incidents resulted in terrain or crash
landings.
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without
accidents? All 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and USN ended
with flight into terrain or crash landings; therefore, none of the UAS were
reported to have landed safely.
What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five years?
UAS accidents identified in this study are predominantly attributable to pilot
error, engine failure, loss of control, lost link and other causes (weather, electrical,
runway overrun, etc.). Of these common causes, the most common accident
cause was engine failure. From 2009-2014, a total of 145 engine failure incidents
resulted in crashes of UAS. The Army (USA) led the incident field with 120
reported engine failures that resulted in a Class A, B, C or D accident. Most of
the USA accidents resulted in a Class C incident (74), which made up 47% of all
Class C USA accidents reported (159). Figure 5 illustrates engine failure by
military service and UAS class.
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Figure 5. Engine Failure
Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more
accidents than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? All UAS
accident reports identified for this research study involved military use UAS. As
a military UAS, they must meet strict airworthiness standards set by the
Department of Defense in accordance with Department of Defense Directive
5030.61 (2013). Although military UAS may meet strict airworthiness standards,
other non-military UAS or other aircraft may not hold the same level of
airworthiness.
For operations of UAS within the US NAS, a UAS will receive airspace
access through issuance of Certificate of Waiver or Authorization and through
receipt of a special airworthiness certificate, as mentioned earlier in this research.
The FAA Roadmap (2013) states (in the future), “COAs and special
airworthiness certificates will transition to more routine integration processes
when a new revised operating rules and procedures are in place and UAS are
capable of complying with them (FAA, 2013a, p. 5).”
In the FAA Roadmap (2013), the agency states that “to gain full access to
the NAS, UAS need to be able to bridge the gap from existing systems requiring
accommodations to future systems that are able to obtain a standard airworthiness
certificate (p. 6).” This means that there needs to be a standard between all UAS
operating in the NAS so they all meet safety standards outlined by the FAA.
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Additionally, not only will the unmanned aircraft itself meet these “airworthiness
standards,” but so will all subsystems and components associated with the
unmanned system, i.e. control station, data link and unmanned aircraft. Ideally,
with a safety standard in place and adhered to by all UAS receiving a standard
airworthiness certificate, safe flight operations should increase with the number of
UAS flying within the NAS.
To support meeting the certificate of waiver or authority process and to
help mitigate the See And Avoid (SAA) issue that UAS will have, “some public
agencies and commercial companies are seeking to develop advanced mitigations,
such as Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA); test evaluations will help
develop the sensor, link, and algorithm requirements that could allow GBSAA to
function as a partial solution set for meeting SAA requirement (FAA, 2013a, pp.
28-29).” With the introduction of GBSAA and the continued work towards
Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) concepts, the requirement for UAS to meet
certification of waiver and authority requirements should make UAS flight
operations safer.
How do current and proposed safety features integrated into a UAS
prevent the most common accident occurrences? The RQ-1 was selected
because it is currently in use by the USAF, US Navy, Customs and Border Patrol
as well as other US agencies that may utilize it in the future within the NAS. The
RQ-1 systems include an “inertial navigation system, satellite communications,
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder, primary & secondary control
modules, electro-optical infrared sensor and synthetic aperture RADAR (SAR),”
(Valdes, 2015, p. 2). These units provide some safety features for the UAS as it is
more advanced than most commonly used UAS. The IFF allows for flight
following, the satellite communications allow beyond-line-of-sight control of the
aircraft, the optical cameras ensure the pilot can see in front of and to the side of
the aircraft during day and night time operations and the SAR supports terrain
mapping and “seeing through haze, clouds or smoke,” (Valdes, 2015, p. 3).
Though there is an array of equipment to support the safe operations of the
UAS, they do not make up for a pilot actually being inside the aircraft. The
cameras that are used for the RQ-1 are limited in their side to side movement and
UAS pilots have likened flying the aircraft to “flying an airplane while looking
through a straw,” (Valdes, 2015, p. 6). This sight limitation adds to the See and
Avoid (SAA) safety issue that FAA is currently trying to overcome. In addition
to the SAA challenge, the RQ-1 does not carry a Terrain Collision and Avoidance
System (TCAS). Without TCAS the UAS pilot as well as other piloted aircraft
within the NAS are unable to know they are on a collision heading.
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The research subjects were interviewed and asked specific questions
pertaining to safety concerns regarding integration of UAS into the NAS. One of
the questions posed to the research subjects was “based on your answers to the
UAS safety questionnaire, describe in your professional opinion the top three
greatest concerns you have with the integration of the UAS into the NAS?”
Research Subject #3 stated one of the greatest concerns was, “the lack of TCAS.”
An additional question posed to the research subjects was how to rectify their
concerns; Research Subject #3 stated, “Until the equipment evolves and we have
onboard sense and avoid, the current processes utilized by the USAF are adequate
to reduce risk.”
The results of the quantitative study within this research yielded that the
most common accidents occurred due to engine loss during cruise. The resulting
accidents were due to loss of power and ended with partial or total destruction of
the craft. In one case, a US Army UAS lost link during landing and struck a
vehicle on the highway, resulting in a Class B accident. In this case, the safety
features in place were not adequate to prevent an accident involving property on
the ground; no one was injured during this accident.
Does UAS pilot training reduce the number of UAS accidents? The
FAA Roadmap (2013) highlights the importance of training to help increase
safety. The Roadmap (2013) emphasizes the importance of pilot training but also
continues to require training for flight crewmembers, mechanics and air traffic
controllers. The FAA recognized that for safe operations to occur for UAS
flights, it does not only involve the pilot but also other crew members such as
sensor operators, crew chiefs and the controllers that over watch the airways. The
Roadmap (2013) details the training requirements for each of these members and
explains, “UAS training standards will mirror manned aircraft training standards
to the maximum extent possible,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 28). According to Research
Subject #3, “the second most important issue is training; there is a misconception
that less training is required to pilot an RPA. I can tell you from experience that
is not the case due to the reduced situational awareness (SA) and inherent delay in
the RPA operations.” It is evident that training is vital to the safe operations of
the UAS.
The FAA Roadmap (2013) identifies pilot training as a significant
requirement for UAS integration into the NAS. The Roadmap states, “as new
UAS evolve, more specific training will be developed for UAS pilots, crew
members and certified flight instructors,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 33). The Roadmap
designated a section to iterate the goals for UAS training requirements and
provide metrics to support.
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The FAA roadmap does not take into account the training that US military
UAS pilots receive, and in many cases Air Force UAS pilots are previously
trained manned aircraft pilots that have been selected for special duty as a UAS
pilot. USAF UAS pilots are required “to complete about 140 hours of academics,
must pass seven tests and run through 36 missions on T-6 simulators, for 48 hours
of training (Tan, 2011).” The FAA is taking steps by including pilots, crew,
maintenance, instructors, and FSDO to ensure the proper and adequate training
for all involved with UAS flight within the NAS.
Research Subject #3 describes that one of the greatest concerns for the
integration of the UAS in the NAS is “lack of training for most, smaller UAS
operators.” Research Subject #3 stated that “this is not the time to develop UAS
‘sport pilot’ equivalent certificate for any civilian operated quad-copter or smaller
platform…but due to system limitations inherent to most UAS, including reduced
ability to sense and avoid, solid training and procedures are required to safely
integrate within the NAS.” Research Subject #2, a Senior Pilot and Evaluator
Pilot for the MQ-9 as well as F-16 and EA-6B, echoes Subject #3 with regards to
training. Research Subject #2 stated that to rectify concerns would be to “educate
the aviation community as a whole about UAS operations, in particular education
should focus on capabilities and limitations of the RPA and about the training the
pilot receives.” Research Subject #2 continued to state, “the FAA/ATC can take
many lessons on RPA incorporation with manned aircraft and operations in the
NAS from the military. Specifically, they can model civilian operations after the
operations from major operating airfields and airspaces in combat areas.” The
FAA Roadmap (2013) seems to take this into account as they have included
training for more than just the pilot, crew and ATC. The Roadmap (2013) states
that the UAS pilots must be trained as would a manned aircraft pilot, but this
training may not be adequate enough and should go above and beyond.
As Research Subject #2 stated the capabilities and limitations of the UAS
must be educated to the aviation community; Research Subject #3 stated that
training is vital and “RPA pilots need to have a base of experience on which to
relate,” Subject #3 stated that “when piloting an RPA, it’s impossible to ‘feel’ the
sensation of the aircraft oscillating (during turbulence) and the pilots must rely on
experience and their instruments to diagnose this.” Educating and training pilots
is essential in the safe operations of the UAS in the NAS, and training policies set
by the FAA should mandate these training requirements that build on experience
and knowledge.
As a result of the interviews, the following nine themes emerged:
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Tremendous growth of micro UAVs and certification process required to
operate them
Public misunderstandings of UAS capabilities
Public capability expectations of UAS
Overall perception that UAS cannot be safely de-conflicted from manned
aircraft
Misconception of increased airspace requirements for UAS
Misunderstanding of naming convention of UAS in “Lost Link” event and
ATC use of terms - when in a lost link event, the UAS goes into
“Emergency Mission Mode” and follows way points to designated area;
this does not mean the UAS is an “Emergency Aircraft.”
Lack of training for most, smaller UAS operators
For USAF Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), the lack of TCAS
Lack of USAF RPA divert options due to launch & recovery equipment
requirements

Research subject survey
To gather the qualitative information required for this research study, a 22
Likert-type scale designed to solicit information on concern with the integration
of the UAS in the NAS from the research subjects. Seven UAS pilots and Sensor
Operators completed the survey. The interview portion of the qualitative study
was completed with three of the pilots that completed the research survey. The
seven interview questions were designed to allow the pilots to provide additional
insight into their concerns with the integration of UAS into the NAS. Due to
locality limitations, the interviews were conducted via email.
The 22 Likert-type scale focused on safety and concerns related to flight
operations in different stages of flight, accidents involving UAS during different
stages of flight, UAS accidents due to mechanical, electrical issues and concern of
UAS accidents based on NAS oversaturation. The Likert-Scale statements
consisted of rankings: 1 – Not at all concerned, 2 – Slightly concerned, 3 –
Moderately concerned, 4 – Very concerned, and 5 – Extremely concerned. The
overall mean was 1.82 (level 2, slightly concerned) and Table 2 displays the mean
answer for each question of the safety section of the questionnaire.
The first three statements of the survey focused on the research subjects’
concern with safety of flight within the United States and saturation of the NAS.
When asked if the subject believed domestic flights are unsafe, all seven
answered the question with a mean concern level of 2 (Slightly concerned).
When questioned about the current oversaturation of the NAS, all seven
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participants answered with a mean concern level of 2.
questions focused on safety concerns and phases of flight.

The next group of

Table 2
Safety Concerns Questionnaire
Safety Concern Section
Mean
Question Mean
Question # Answer
#
Answer
1
2
12
2
2.57
13
3
2
14
4
2
15
5
1.86
16
6
2.14
17
7
1.53
18
8
2.29
19
9
1.43
20
10
1.71
21
11
1.43
22

1.71
1.71
2.29
1.86
1.43
1.57
1.43
1.71
1.71
2.29
1.86

The research subjects were questioned about safety concerns with regards
to aircraft accidents involving a UAS during three phases of flight (takeoff, cruise
and landing); the average level of concern between the seven subjects were 1.98,
or level 2 (slightly concerned). The participants were then questioned with
regards to an UAS accident occurring during a lost link event, all participants
responded, with a mean level of concern being 1.71. Two participants answered
they were “Not at all concerned” (level 1) and the remaining five answered they
were “Slightly concerned” (level 2). The next two questions pertained to UAS
accidents involving midair collisions. All seven participants answered the midair
collision question, resulting in a mean level of concern being 2.29. When
questioned about the increase of potential accidents with terrain (homes,
buildings, roads and populated areas), all seven participants responded that
resulted in a mean level of concern of 1.86.
The final section of statements posed to the seven participants focused on
safety concerns with regards to an increase of congestion with UAS in the NAS.
When questioned about an increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during
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takeoff, cruise and landing, the participants averaged concern response were 1.71,
1.71 and 1.43 respectively with an overall mean of 1.61 (level 2). Again, the
participants were surveyed on a lost link scenario and all answers provided a
mean of 1.71, no change from an earlier statement pertaining to lost link
accidents.
Conclusions
Research Objective: Based on the most common UAS accidents causes
and US Air Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is
there a relationship between safety concerns and safety issues?
Between 2009 and 2014, there were 417 reported accidents by the US Air
Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Army (USA) involving UAS. Of those
accidents, the USAF reported 45, USA reported 324 and the USN reported 48. Of
the common causes, pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of control (CT), lost
link (LL) and other (O), the most common accident cause was engine failure.
From 2009-2014, there were at total of 145 engine failure incidents that resulted
in a crash of a UAS. The Army (USA) led the field with 120 reported engine
failures that resulted in a Class A, B, C or D accident. Most of the USA accidents
resulted in a Class C incident (74), which made up 47% of all Class C USA
accidents reported (159).
When interviewed, the top three concerns of the UAS pilots and sensor
operators did not relate to the number of accidents or types of accidents, as the
concerns involved policy and perception and not accident involvement.
The Likert-Scale findings of this study showed elevated concern of
accidents during a specific phase of flight (takeoff & landing), and the amount of
respondent concern of those types accidents occurring. Results also indicate a
low number of incidents and accidents occurring during the cruise phase of flight
and the low level of respondent concern with accidents occurring during that
phase of flight. The calculated percentage of accidents during each specific phase
of flight was categorized low to high: low- 0-29%; medium- 30-50%; high>51%.
During the takeoff phase of flight there were a total of 84 accidents of 405
accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of
flight not calculated) and amounted to 21% of the number of accidents.
Respondent concern of accidents during this phase of flight was also low.
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During the cruise phase of flight there were a total of 218 accidents of 405
total accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase
of flight not calculated) and amounted to 54% of the number of accidents.
Respondent level of concern of this phase of flight was low in comparison to the
higher level of accidents.
During the landing phase of flight there were a total of 103 accidents of
405 accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of
flight not calculated) and amounted to 25% of the number of accidents.
Respondent concern of the landing phase was low.
Midair and near midair accidents and level of concern were observed, with
a 15 near midair collisions and 2 midair collisions being reported. Of the 405
total accidents that were recorded, 4% could have involved a near midair incident;
near midair reports were not calculated in the total number of accidents observed.
Less than 1% of the accidents observed involved a midair collision. Results of
the three sections questioning the level of concern related to midair incidents and
accidents indicated a slight respondent concern of midair collisions.
Recommendations
The FAA has crafted FAA Roadmap 2013 and implemented the UAS
Integration Office to support the integration and operations of UAS. The FAA
should continue to refine the Roadmap as it is integrated and update policy and
regulations as required. The UAS Integration Office should provide UAS
operators a way to provide feedback and lessons learned to make the process,
procedures and operations of the UAS safer and efficient. Additionally, the FAA
should research ways to deal with and implement contingency plans for
unintentional and deliberate accidents involving UAS and further legislation must
budget for the increased requirements.
The FAA Roadmap 2013 stresses the importance of training pilots, crews,
maintenance and air traffic controllers on UAS operations and this should
continue and evolve as the integration progresses. The training provided should
be monitored and reviewed by Flight Standard District Office (FSDO) Inspectors
and held to the same standards as manned aircraft and pilots. The FAA must
create and uphold a standards and evaluations system that mirror manned flight
operations but is also unique to UAS flight operations. FSDO Inspectors should
provide inputs into the success and failures of such a system as they gather
information from field inspections.
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The public perception of UAS is garnered from what is seen in media.
This may skew views on operations and safety of the UAS. The public may not
have a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the UAS as well
as the background and concept of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 2012.
Research Subject #1 and #2 stated that their concerns included, “public
misunderstandings of UAS capabilities, public capability expectations of UAS,
overall perception that UAS cannot be safely de-conflicted from manned aircraft
and misconception of increased airspace requirements for UAS.” The UAS
Integration Office should research and implement a public service campaign to
inform the public of UAS operations, the concept of the Reform Act and way
forward for the safe integration of the UAS into NAS. This campaign’s focus
should aim to inform the public of UAS operations and convey a positive
perception of UAS use and safety issues. The UAS Integration Office must
implement a way to track safety issues, such as accidents, near mid-air and midair collisions as well as any research done on UAS operations and provide public
accessibility to this database for review.
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Appendix A

Safety Concern Questionnaire
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SAFETY:
1

2

3

4

Not Concerned

Slightly Concerned

Moderately Concerned Very Concerned

5
Extremely Concerned

On a scale of 1 - 5 with regards to standard manned flight, please rate your level of
concern as it pertains to:
1. Belief that flying within the domestic United States is not safe?
1
2
3
4
5
2. Domestic airliner’s safety record when you are flying in a commercial airliner?
1
2
3
4
5
3. Oversaturation of the NAS with airplane operations?
1
2
3
4
5
4. Mid air collisions when you fly?
1
2
3
4

5

5. Runway incursions when you fly?
1
2
3
4

5

6. Being involved in an aircraft accident during takeoff?
1
2
3
4
5
7. Being involved in an aircraft accident at cruise altitude?
1
2
3
4
5
8. Being involved in an aircraft accident during landing?
1
2
3
4
5
Based on an increase of UAS in the NAS, on a level of 1 - 5 how concerned are you:
9. Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during takeoff?
1
2
3
4
5
10. Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during cruise?
1
2
3
4
5
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11. Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during landing?
1
2
3
4
5
12. If you knew that a UAS had less safety equipment than commercial airliners, how
concerned would you be for airspace safety?
1
2
3
4
5
13. Based on your understanding and knowledge of UASs, how concerned are you that
an accident would occur if a UAS lost its data connection to the operator?
1
2
3
4
5
14. How concerned are you that UAS in the national airspace system would cause more
mid air collisions?
1
2
3
4
5
15. How concerned are you that the UAS in the national airspace system would increase
the potential of accidents with terrain (i.e. homes, buildings, roads, populated areas)?
1
2
3
4
5
16. There will be an increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during takeoff?
1
2
3
4
5
17. There will be increases in aircraft accidents with a UAS during cruise?
1
2
3
4
5
18. An increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during landing?
1
2
3
4
5
19. Based on your knowledge of UASs safety features, how concerned would you be for
airspace safety?
1
2
3
4
5
20. Based on your knowledge of UASs, how concerned are you that an accident would
occur if a UAS lost its data connection to the operator?
1
2
3
4
5
21. How concerned are you that UAS in the national airspace system would cause more
mid air collisions?
1
2
3
4
5
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22. How concerned are you that the UAS in the national airspace system would increase
the potential of accidents with terrain (i.e. homes, buildings, roads, populated areas)?
1
2
3
4
5
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Appendix B

Interview Questions
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Briefly describe your aviation experience to include training, flight hours, pilot or
aircrew experience.



Briefly describe your experience and knowledge of unmanned aerial systems to
include any piloting or sensor operator experience or any research you’ve
accomplished.



Briefly describe your duties in the current position you hold to include training,
years of experience and daily duties.



Describe your experience conducting safety inspections, mishap investigations
and/or accident investigations.



Based on your answers to the unmanned aerial system (UAS) safety
questionnaire, describe in your professional opinion the top three greatest
concerns you have with the integration of the UAS in the National Airspace
System (NAS).



Based on your answers to your greatest concerns of the UAS integration into the
NAS, what needs to be done to rectify those top three concerns?



In your overall assessment, do you feel the integration of the UAS into the NAS
is a major safety concern or do you feel that with the current direction of the
integration there will be minimal impact to safety?
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